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I. INTRODUCTION
Dwayne killed Brenda;1 as a result, Brenda could not testify at the subsequent
trial. It had become common practice for courts to apply the doctrine of forfeiture
by wrongdoing as an equitable principle in cases such as this, in which a defendant’s actions caused a victim to be unavailable to testify.2 In 2008, the Supreme
Court decided Giles v. California3 and altered that exercise of the forfeiture doc________________________
"
J.D., Gonzaga University School of Law, May 2009. Special thanks to Professor Rosanna Peterson for
her guidance, critical eye, and encouraging words, and to my family and Estee Lewis for their support. You can
contact the author at msmith@lawschool.gonzaga.edu.
1.
See infra notes 11, 16 and accompanying text.
2.
See infra notes 34-37, 41-42, 126-29 and accompanying text.
3.
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) [hereinafter Giles 3].
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trine. The Court added a requirement that a defendant must actually intend to prevent a witness from testifying in order for forfeiture by wrongdoing to apply.4
This article begins with a presentation of the Giles case in Part II. Part III provides an historical understanding of the confrontation right and forfeiture by
wrongdoing under the Constitution, common law, and Federal Rules of Evidence.
Finally, through an examination of waiver requirements for other confrontation
rights, Part IV demonstrates that the Court’s addition of an intent element has
turned the forfeiture doctrine into a waiver of the confrontation right by misconduct.
II. GILES V. CALIFORNIA
A. Facts
“If I catch you fucking around I’ll kill you,” Dwayne Giles said to Brenda Avie
while pointing a knife at her.5 This was the end of an argument between the
couple, which began when Giles accused Avie of having an affair.6 Giles grabbed
Avie, lifted her up, and started to choke her.7 Avie was able to break free, but fell
to the floor, and Giles began punching her before pulling out the knife. 8 The police
responded to the domestic disturbance, and Officer Stephen Kotsinadelis took
Avie’s statement. 9
Three weeks later,10 Avie lay bleeding and dying on the ground with Giles
standing over her holding a gun.11 She had been shot six times.12
There were no witnesses to the shooting, but Giles’ niece was inside the house
and heard what happened. 13 She heard the couple engaged in a normal conversa-

________________________

4.
See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
5.
People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) [hereinafter Giles 1].
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
There is a slight discrepancy as to the date of the domestic disturbance. The appellate court lists the
date of the domestic disturbance as September 5, 2001, and the date of the shooting as September 29, 2002. Id.
However, the date of the domestic disturbance is consistently listed as “weeks” prior to the shooting. See Giles 3,
128 S. Ct. at 2681 (“about three weeks before the shooting”); People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 436 (Cal. 2007)
[hereinafter Giles 2] (“[a] few weeks before the shooting” and also listing the date as September 5, 2002); Giles 1,
19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846 (“[a] few weeks before the shooting”); see also Brief of Petitioner at *3, Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (No. 07-6053) (listing the date as September 5, 2002). Thus, the author infers that the
appellate court’s citing of the year as 2001 was a typographical error.
11.
Giles 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 845.
12.
Id.
Two of those wounds were fatal; one was consistent with her holding up her hand at the
time she was shot; one was consistent with her having turned to her side when she was shot;
and one was consistent with the shot being fired while she was lying on the ground.
Id.
13.

Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2681.
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tion, but then heard Avie yell “Granny” repeatedly and a series of gunshots. 14
Giles left the scene of the crime and was apprehended two weeks later.15
B. Procedural History
1. Trial
At trial, Giles testified to shooting Avie, but claimed his actions were in selfdefense.16 He said that Avie shot another man before their relationship, that she
threatened others with a knife, and that she previously vandalized his property. 17
According to Giles, prior to the shooting, Avie called him and threatened to kill his
new girlfriend. 18 She then showed up at the house and told Giles she was going to
kill both him and his new girlfriend, so Giles retrieved his gun. 19 He then claimed
Avie “charged” him, and he shot her in response because he feared that she had a
weapon in her hand. 20 However, Avie did not have a weapon. 21
During trial, in order to establish a propensity for domestic violence by Giles, 22
the prosecution offered evidence of the earlier domestic disturbance between Giles
and Avie. 23 Officer Kotsinadelis testified about his response to the call, including
statements made by Avie. 24 The defense objected to the statements, based on hearsay.25 The trial court ruled Avie’s statements were admissible under a hearsay exception allowing trustworthy out-of-court statements about the infliction of physical injury on an unavailable declarant.26 The jury found Giles guilty of first degree
murder,27 and “[he] was sentenced to prison for a term of 50 years to life.”28
________________________

14.
Giles 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 845. The shooting took place at Giles’ grandmother’s house. Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 845-46.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 845.
22.
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109 (West Supp. 2009) (amended 2004 and 2005).
23.
Giles 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846. This was done in order “[t]o rebut [Giles’] claim of self-defense and
impeach his testimony . . . .” Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2695.
24.
Giles 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a) (West Supp. 2009), which provides in pertinent part:
Evidence of a statement by a declarant is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if all of
the following conditions are met: (1) The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain
the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant. (2) The declarant is unavailable as a witness pursuant to Section 240. (3) The statement was made at or near the time of
the infliction or threat of physical injury. . . . (4) The statement was made under circumstances that would indicate its trustworthiness. (5) The statement was made in writing, was
electronically recorded, or made to a physician, nurse, paramedic, or to a law enforcement
official.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a).
27.
Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 437. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West
2008) (amended 2002) (California’s first degree murder statutes). The jury also found Giles “personally dis-
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2. California Court of Appeals
On appeal, Giles contended that the admission of Avie’s statements to Officer
Kotsinadelis violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. 29 He
claimed that the statements were testimonial under Crawford v. Washington30 and
should have been excluded.31 Giles argued “that a defendant forfeits a Confrontation Clause objection through wrongdoing only when he is charged with or is under
investigation for a crime, and wrongfully procures the witness’s absence from trial
with the intent of preventing testimony about that crime.”32 Giles further argued
that applying the forfeiture doctrine in cases where the defendant is on trial for
homicide of the victim witness, such as his own, would require the trial court to
determine that the defendant is guilty before admitting victim hearsay evidence. 33
The appellate court held that Giles forfeited his Confrontation Clause objection
to Avie’s statements by killing her.34 It classified the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing as an historical, equitable principle disallowing a defendant to benefit
from wrongfully procuring a witness’s absence. 35 The court refused to limit the
doctrine only to defendants with intent, at the time of the crime, to prevent a witness from testifying against him. 36 In sum, “forfeiture by wrongdoing is both amply supported by the record and equitable under the circumstances. [Giles] cannot
be heard to complain that he was unable to cross-examine Avie about her prior,

charged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death.” Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 437. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
12022.53(d) (West 2000) (amended 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2006).
28.
Giles 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 844.
29.
Id. at 845. Giles’ secondary appellate argument was that the evidence did not establish the premeditation and deliberation necessary for first degree murder, and his conviction should be reduced to second degree
murder. Id. The court of appeals found that the evidence “was more than adequate” for his first degree murder
conviction. Id. at 852.
30.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Crawford decision was issued after Giles’ trial.
Giles 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846.
31.
Id. at 846-47. It was accepted by all of the reviewing courts that Avie’s statements to Officer Kotsinadelis during the domestic disturbance were testimonial in nature, without any court undergoing such an analysis.
See Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2682; Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 438; Giles 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 847. On remand, the appellate court determined that “Avie’s statements were testimonial because they were made in response to a focused
police interview aimed at establishing the circumstances of a crime.” People v. Giles, No. B166937, 2009 WL
457832, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Giles 4].
32.
Giles 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 848.
33.
Id. at 849. The appellate court found that making a determination on the admissibility of homicide
victim hearsay evidence does not present procedural problems for trial courts. Id. “A court is not precluded from
determining the preliminary facts necessary for an evidentiary ruling merely because they coincide with an ultimate issue in the case.” Id. As with other hearsay evidence, the court would make a decision based on preliminary facts. Id. “This ruling will not infringe in any way upon the ultimate question for the jury’s resolutionwhether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the homicide as charged.” Id.
34.
Id. at 850. The appellate court explicitly stated it was a narrow holding with four limitations: 1) hearsay statements by unavailable witnesses are not automatically admissible, but must fit under an exception; 2) the
criminal act making the witness unavailable must have been intentional rather than incidental; 3) forfeiture by
wrongdoing can only apply if equitable, and not if it would be unjust; and 4) victim homicide hearsay evidence is
to be admitted without informing the jury of any particular findings by the court. Id. at 850-51.
35.
Id. at 847-48.
36.
Id. at 848 (citing United States v. Emergy, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Miller,
116 F.3d 641, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1997); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan. 2004); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1,
2-3 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004)).
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trustworthy statements to law enforcement when it was his own criminal violence
that made her unavailable for cross-examination.”37
3. California Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of California granted review regarding application of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine38 and affirmed the court of appeals. 39 The court
found that it was proper for post-Crawford courts to apply the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine as an equitable principle, “allowing fact finders access to relevant
evidence that the defendant caused not to be available through live testimony.” 40
Regarding Giles, the court opined that he “should not be able to take advantage of
his own wrong by using the victim’s statements to bolster his self-defense theory,
while capitalizing on her unavailability and asserting his confrontation rights to
prevent the prosecution from using her conflicting statements.”41 The court determined that Giles forfeited his right to confront Avie’s statements by wrongdoing
when he caused her unavailability to testify through an unlawful homicide.42
C. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari43 in order to determine “whether a defendant forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the defendant
made the witness unavailable to testify at trial.”44 Although this was the initial
framing, the Court then narrowed the issue to whether such an understanding of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is an exception to the confrontation right established at the founding, as required by Crawford.45 The Supreme Court held that at
the founding, and historically thereafter, forfeiture by wrongdoing was only applied
when there was intent to prevent a witness from testifying. 46 As expressed by the
California Court of Appeals, “[Giles] did not forfeit his right to confront [Avie’s]
statement unless he killed her with the intent to prevent her from testifying.”47 The
________________________

37.
Giles 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 851.
38.
People v. Giles, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004). It limited the issues to 1) more specifically, application of
forfeiture by wrongdoing in the Giles case; and 2) more broadly, whether the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine
applies when the wrongdoing that makes the witness unavailable to testify is the same as the criminal offense. Id.
39.
Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 447.
40.
Id. at 444.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 447. The Court found that “independent evidence, considered with the victim’s prior statements,
support[ed] the Court of Appeal’s conclusion . . . .” Id.
43.
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008).
44.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2681.
45.
Id. at 2682. By narrowing the issue in this way, the majority relied mostly on pre-Reynolds cases;
whereas, the California Supreme Court examined American precedent by focusing on post-Reynolds cases. See
infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text (majority’s use of cases); Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 438-42 (California Supreme Court’s use of cases).
46.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2684, 2687, 2693.
47.
Giles 4, at *1 (statement of the Supreme Court’s holding by the California Court of Appeals on remand).
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Supreme Court vacated the decision of the California Supreme Court and remanded the case.48
The majority49 used three main avenues to support its interpretation of forfeiture by wrongdoing: 1) plain reading of the language, 2) analysis of common law
cases, and 3) analysis of subsequent cases. 50
The analysis began with an examination of forfeiture by wrongdoing as defined
and understood at common law. 51 Based on Lord Morley’s Case in 1666, “forfeiture by wrongdoing[] permitted the introduction of statements of a witness who
was ‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.” 52
The majority interpreted the terms in that definition as “suggest[ing] that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the
witness from testifying”53 and determined “that a purpose-based definition of these
terms governed.”54 However, the majority also admitted that under some definitions, all cases where a defendant caused the unavailability of the witness could be
included.55
Next, the majority studied cases that applied the doctrine at the time of the
founding. 56 In its examination of common law cases, the majority found an “absence of . . . admitting prior statements on a forfeiture theory when the defendant
had not engaged in conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying” and the
“uniform exclusion of unconfronted inculpatory testimony by murder victims.” 57
The majority determined that at the founding it was “plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.”58 In the two main cases espoused by the majority,
both courts refused to admit the homicide victims’ statements because they had not
been confronted by the defendant, and the statements were not considered dying
declarations.59 The Court also used these cases to show that the prosecutors did not
argue, nor did the courts consider on their own, admitting the statements because
the defendants had made the witnesses unavailable through murder. 60
The analysis continued with an examination of cases since the founding. 61 The
majority reviewed the seminal American case for forfeiture by wrongdoing, 62 Rey________________________
48.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2693.
49.
Justice Scalia authored the opinion of the Court, except for one section. Id. at 2680. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito joined in full. Id. Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined to all but one section, Part II-D-2. Id.
50.
Id. at 2688.
51.
Id. at 2682-84.
52.
Id. at 2683.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 2683-84.
55.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2683. The word “procurement” could “merely require that a defendant have
caused the witness’s absence . . . .” Id. The word “means” may “sweep in all cases in which a defendant caused a
witness to fail to appear . . . .” Id.
56.
Id. at 2684-86.
57.
Id. at 2688.
58.
Id. at 2684.
59.
Id. at 2684-85 (citing King v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (K.B.); King v. Dingler, (1791)
168 Eng. Rep. 383 (K.B.)). See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
60.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2685-86.
61.
Id. at 2687-88.
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nolds v. United States.63 In Reynolds, the defendant was on trial for bigamy. 64
When presented with a subpoena for his alleged second wife, he refused to disclose
her whereabouts.65 When she did not appear to testify, her testimony from a previous trial was read into evidence. 66 On appeal, the defendant argued that her previous testimony should not have been admitted because it violated his confrontation right.67 The Reynolds Court did not find an error,68 stating that “[The Constitution] grants [a defendant] the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses
against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his
privilege.”69 Although admitting Reynolds was based on broad equitable principles, the majority applied a narrow analysis and concluded that the Reynolds
Court adopted a forfeiture doctrine that only included conduct by the defendant
intending to prevent the testimony of a witness. 70
From the Reynolds case in 1878 until 1985, courts only applied the forfeiture
by wrongdoing doctrine to witness tampering. 71 This narrow doctrine was codified
in the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1997.72
The majority spent the rest of its argument responding to the dissent. 73 Notably, it did acknowledge that in the context of domestic violence, prior statements of
an abused homicide victim may be allowed under forfeiture by wrongdoing, if
there was “intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the
authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution” when the prior statements
were made. 74 Essentially, the majority allowed for forfeiture by wrongdoing to
62.
Id. at 2687.
63.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
64.
Id. at 146.
65.
Id. at 148-50.
66.
Id. at 151-52.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 160.
69.
Id. at 158. The Court further found that the defendant was present in court and had the opportunity to
defend against the accusation that he had kept the witness from the trial. Id. at 160.
70.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2687. The majority argued that if the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing applied beyond intent to prevent witness testimony, “one would have expected it to be routinely invoked in murder
prosecutions . . . in which the victim’s prior statements inculpated the defendant.” Id.
71.
Id. In 1985, the Eleventh Circuit found that a defendant lost his confrontation right when he murdered
the witness. United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985).
Rouco waived his right to cross-examine Benitez by killing him. “The Sixth Amendment
does not stand as a shield to protect the accused from his own misconduct or chicanery.”
We have previously stated that:
The law simply cannot countenance a defendant deriving benefits from murdering the
chief witness against him. To permit such subversion of a criminal prosecution
“would be contrary to public policy, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the
confrontation clause,” … and make a mockery of the system of justice that the right
was designed to protect.
Id. (citations omitted).
72.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2687 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006)); see FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(6).
73.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2688-93.
74.
Id. at 2693. “Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the
victim would have been expected to testify.” Id.
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relate back to the time of domestic violence, if there was intent at that time to prevent the victim from “testifying.”75
D. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
1. Concurring: Justices Thomas and Alito
Justices Thomas and Alito each wrote separate opinions pointing out that
Avie’s statements did not trigger the Confrontation Clause. 76 Referring back to his
concurring opinion in Davis v. Washington,77 Justice Thomas thought that Avie’s
statements did not implicate the Confrontation Clause because they were informal,
and thus non-testimonial.78 Similarly, Justice Alito felt “the real problem concern[ed] the scope of the confrontation right,” in that it only applies to out-of-court
statements that are parallel to those made by witnesses at trial.79 Each noted that
the challenge was not preserved as an issue on appeal, and consequently their concern was not before the Court.80 If Avie’s statements did trigger the Confrontation
Clause, then both ultimately concurred in the judgment. 81
2. Concurring in Part: Justice Souter
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, wrote a concurrence joining all but one part of the majority’s opinion. 82 He expressed that a showing of
intent to prevent a witness from testifying satisfies equity, when the alternative
result would be circular reasoning. 83
If the victim’s prior statement were admissible solely because the defendant
kept the witness out of court by committing homicide, admissibility of the victim’s
statement to prove guilt would turn on finding the defendant guilty of the homicidal act causing the absence [of the declarant]; evidence that the defendant killed
would come in because the defendant probably killed [the declarant].84
He further supported the majority’s conclusion regarding the domestic violence
context.85 Intent could be inferred from a typical domestic violence relationship
because the abuser separates the victim from others, including avenues from which
________________________

75.
Id. For discussions on the forfeiture doctrine in the context of domestic violence, see Tim Donaldson,
Combating Victim/Witness Intimidation in Family Violence Cases, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 643 (2008); Andrew KingRies, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A Panacea for Victimless Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 39 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 441 (2006); Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?,
15 J.L. & POL’Y 759 (2007).
76.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2693-94 (Thomas, J., concurring; Alito, J., concurring).
77.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 840 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring).
78.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2693-94 (Thomas, J., concurring).
79.
Id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).
80.
Id. at 2693-94 (Thomas, J., concurring; Alito, J., concurring).
81.
Id. at 2694.
82.
Id. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2695.
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she could get help. 86 “If the evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of [domestic violence], it would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant before he
killed his victim, say in a fit of anger.”87
3. Dissenting: Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, drafted the dissenting
opinion.88 According to the dissent, Giles forfeited his confrontation right by killing Avie. 89
Breyer distinguished between the word “intent” and the terms “purpose” or
“motive.”90 He argued that the majority would only apply the doctrine of forfeiture
by wrongdoing when a defendant purposely intended to prevent the witness from
testifying. 91 Conversely, Justice Breyer would apply forfeiture by wrongdoing
when a defendant’s actions resulted in the witness being unable to testify, regardless of whether the defendant had the particular purpose of keeping the victim from
testifying. 92
He also advocated for state rights. 93 A broad reading of the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine does not demand admission of all prior testimonial statements.94 Rather, “[s]tate hearsay rules remain in place; and those rules will determine when, whether, and how evidence of the kind at issue here will come into
evidence.”95
His underlying concern was that the majority’s rule, requiring a showing of
purpose, “grants the defendant not fair treatment, but a windfall” in domestic violence cases where victims are commonly hesitant or unavailable to testify. 96 Under the dissent’s opinion, a defendant could forfeit his confrontation right through
threats, by murdering the witness, or by a showing of domestic violence. 97
________________________
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.

What important constitutional interest is served, say, where a prior testimonial statement of
a victim of abuse is at issue, by a constitutional rule that lets that evidence in if the defendant killed a victim purposely to stop her from testifying, but keeps it out if the defendant
killed her knowing she could no longer testify while acting out of anger or revenge?
Id. at 2708.
90.
Id. at 2697-99.
91.
Id. at 2698. In criminal law, intent can be presumed from actions because it is presumed a person
knows the consequence of her actions. Id. In the context of forfeiture by wrongdoing, Breyer sees the majority
moving from this concept of presumed intent to requiring a defendant to have the particular purpose or motive of
keeping a witness from testifying. Id.
92.
See Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2698-99.
93.
See id. at 2700. “The majority’s rule, which requires exclusion, would deprive the States of this freedom and flexibility [in applying their evidentiary rules].” Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 2709.
97.
Id. at 2708-09.
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E. On Remand
On remand, “[the California] Supreme Court transferred the cause back to [the
Court of Appeal] with directions to vacate [the] previous decision and to resolve
any remaining issues in light of Giles v. California.”98 The appellate court reversed
its earlier decision, holding that Giles’ confrontation right had been violated when
Avie’s statements were admitted because “[t]he prosecution did not establish that
[Giles] procured [Avie’s] absence with the intent to prevent her from testifying.” 99
Assumedly, the next step is for Giles to be retried.100
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES &
FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING
As displayed in the procedural history of this case, an understanding of forfeiture by wrongdoing is dependent on an historical examination of the doctrine. 101
The outcome further depends on the time span of cases that are examined, theories
of constitutional interpretation applied, and rules of evidence created. This section
provides a brief overview of the confrontation right and doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing under the Constitution, common law, and rules of evidence.
A. Constitution
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains the Confrontation Clause, which provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”102 The confrontation right involves two parts: 1) testimony of witnesses under oath, and 2)
cross-examination of those witnesses. 103 The aspiration of the confrontation right,
and especially cross-examination, is to discover the truth.104 The reliability of evidence is secured “by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding before the trier of fact.”105
________________________

98.
Giles 4, at *1.
99.
Id. at *3-4. The appellate court found that it was not harmless error because “a reasonable doubt exists
whether the admission of Avie’s statements contributed to the jury’s verdict.” Id. at *4-5.
100.
The appellate court provided guidance to the trial court for retrial. Avie’s statement may be determined
non-testimonial if a foundational showing is made of a contemporaneous emergency. Id. at *3-4. Avie’s statements may still be admissible under forfeiture by wrongdoing if it is established that Giles’ intent was to prevent
Avie from testifying. Id. at *4. And, there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to convict
Giles of first degree murder. Id. at *5-6.
101.
See supra Parts II.B.2-D.3.
102.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
103.
Enrico B. Valdez & Shelley A. Nieto Dahlberg, Tales From the Crypt: An Examination of Forfeiture
by Misconduct and Its Applicability to the Texas Legal System, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 99, 103-04 (1999).
104.
Id. at 104. “[C]ross-examination is ‘the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the
truth.’” Id. (quoting 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (1974)).
105.
James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A
Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459,
527 (2003) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990)).
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For twenty-four years, under Ohio v. Roberts,106 sufficiently reliable out-ofcourt statements were admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 107 Such statements were deemed sufficiently reliable if they “[fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”108
Then in Crawford, the Supreme Court determined that “testimonial” out-ofcourt statements were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant.109 “Holding that hearsay rules and judicial determinations of reliability no longer satisfied a defendant’s confrontation right, Crawford announced:
‘Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.’”110
Despite this dramatic change, the Crawford court explicitly allowed an exception for the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing as an equitable principle. “[T]he
rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation
claims on essentially equitable grounds . . . .”111 This was reaffirmed in Davis:
“We reiterate what we said in Crawford . . . . [O]ne who obtains the absence of a
witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”112
Proponents of a broad reading of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine would
argue that the “Confrontation Clause does not remedy self-created confrontation
problems. . . . When the defendant causes the loss of the witness that makes confrontation impossible, the Sixth Amendment has no role.”113 On the other hand,
defendants’ rights advocates may argue that such a broad forfeiture doctrine is contrary to the presumption of innocence and strips defendants of a basic constitutional
right prior to trial.114
B. Common Law
Similar to other hearsay exceptions, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was
“ultimately incorporated from English common law, which serves as the foundation for the American legal system.”115 This section provides a limited chronological overview of historical case law regarding forfeiture by wrongdoing, and begins
________________________

106.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
107.
Id. at 66.
108.
Id.
109.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). For more on Crawford and its implications, see
James F. Flanagan, Foreshadowing the Future of Forfeiture/Estoppel By Wrongdoing: Davis v. Washington and
the Necessity of the Defendant’s Intent to Intimidate the Witness, 15 J.L. & POL’ Y 863 (2007); Aaron R. Petty,
Proving Forfeiture and Bootstrapping Testimony After Crawford, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 593 (2007); Robert M.
Pitler, Crawford and Beyond: Revisited in Dialogue, 15 J.L. & POL’ Y 333 (2007).
110.
Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 437 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69-70).
111.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
112.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
113.
See Flanagan, supra note 105, at 526.
114.
Id. at 527-28.
115.
Valdez & Dahlberg, supra note 103, at 134-35.
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with a response to the majority’s limitation of the doctrine to the time of the founding.
The Giles majority recognized that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine existed at the founding; however, they were determined to limit today’s application to
that founding-era understanding. 116 Their determination to disregard the slow evolution of the law over time is troubling considering the legal status of women at
that time. Historically, women were treated as and considered property of men. 117
“[W]omen’s testimony [under the common law] was banned in courts of law or
subject to limitations not imposed on men’s testimony on the theory that women’s
testimony was unreliable.”118 Both of the majority’s supportive cases involved
men killing their wives, one in 1789 and the other in 1791, and the women making
statements to that effect after the violent act but before their deaths. 119 Possible
underlying reasons for not allowing the wives’ statements were that women were
considered property of their husbands and unreliable by virtue of their gender. The
majority’s determination to limit the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing to only
the founding-era’s common law understanding is not persuasive because it propagates reliance on an antiquated view of women.
The first significant American case to apply the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, Reynolds, took place in 1878.120 The focus was on whether the witness’ absence was caused by the defendant, not on the intent behind his wrongful conduct.121 “The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts. . . . [I]f he voluntarily keeps the
witnesses away, he cannot insist on his [confrontation] privilege.”122 The Court
also propounded the equitable philosophy behind the forfeiture doctrine: “The rule
has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of
his own wrong . . . .”123
The forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine kept a low profile for nearly 100 years
until “the lower federal courts began applying the forfeiture rule extensively in the
context of witness tampering cases.”124 In these cases, in an attempt to prevent a

________________________

116.
Giles 3, 128 S. Ct. at 2682, 2864-86. See supra notes 56-59, and accompanying text.
117.
Deana Pollard Sacks, Elements of Liberty, 61 SMU L. REV. 1557, 1577 (2008). As applied in the
context of rape: “The word ‘rape’ originates from the ancient Roman term ‘raptus,’ which meant an act that ‘was
not a public crime but rather a private wrong against the man who had legal power over the woman or property
violently seized by the raptor.’” Caia Johnson, Note, Traumatic Amnesia in the New Millennium: A New Approach to Exhumed Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 387, 401 n.73 (2007)
(quoting J AMES A. BRUNDAGE, SEX, LAW AND MARRIAGE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 63 (1993)).
118.
Rebecca D. Cornia, Current Use of Battered Woman Syndrome: Institutionalization of Negative Stereotypes About Women, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 99, 113 (1997).
119.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
120.
See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text. Reynolds relied on Lord Morley’s Case from the English common law, and cases thereafter. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878).
121.
Id. at 158-61. “Notably . . . the court did not suggest that the rule’s applicability hinged on [the defendant’s] purpose or motivation in committing the wrongful act.” Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 438.
122.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158.
123.
Id. at 159.
124.
Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 439.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol13/iss1/4

12

: Goodbye Forfeiture, Hello Waiver

Fall 2009

Goodbye Forfeiture, Hello Waiver

149

witness from testifying against him, a defendant would procure the witness’ absence. 125
The Crawford decision was a turning point; “[a]fter Crawford, the response of
many courts . . . was to focus on the equitable forfeiture rationale which could
eliminate the need for evidence of witness tampering and broaden the scope of the
rule to all homicide cases.”126 Courts applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to cases in which the homicide victim made statements about the violent
crime itself, 127 and regarding prior statements by the homicide victim. 128 “Significantly, the courts in these cases applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine although there was no indication the defendants killed the victims with the intent of
preventing testimony at a future trial.”129
The post-Crawford cases resulted in a split as to whether the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine required intent to prevent testimony:
Some state and federal courts have stated that the intent-to-silence
requirement is only mandated by the federal rules and not by the
Constitution. . . . Other courts have stated that the intent-to-silence
requirement is an element of their forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrines, although stopping short of holding that the intent requirement is constitutionally compelled. 130
C. Rules of Evidence
The forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was codified in the Federal Rules of
Evidence as a hearsay exception in 1997.131 Rule 804(b)(6) states in pertinent part:
Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
....
(6) Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. A statement offered against a party
that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended
________________________

125.
Id. “As with the federal courts, the state courts generally applied the [forfeiture by wrongdoing] rule
when the defendant intended to, and did, tamper with an actual or potential witness to prevent the witness from
cooperating with the authorities or testifying at trial.” Id. at 440.
126.
Id.

127.
See, e.g., State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961
(S.D. Ohio 2005).

128.
See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1
(Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
129.
Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 441.
130.
Id. at 441-42.
131.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text. For a summary of the legislative history, see Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion of Hearsay Through Forfeiture by Wrongdoing—Old Wine in a New Bottle—Solving the
Mystery of the Codification of the Concept into Federal Rule 806(b)(6), 80 NEB. L. REV. 891, 903-08 (2001).
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to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.132
The advisory committee stated that the rule was meant “to provide that a party
forfeits the right to object on hearsay grounds to the admission of a declarant’s
prior statement when the party’s deliberate wrongdoing or acquiescence therein
procured the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”133 Notably, the original
title of the rule was altered from “waiver by misconduct” to “forfeiture by wrongdoing.”134
The purpose of the rule was to prevent “abhorrent behavior ‘which strikes at
the heart of the system of justice itself.’”135 From this statement, it appears that
broad equitable principles were the basis for the rule. However, the rule was actually proposed to “address the problem of witness tampering.”136 During drafting,
some members were concerned that the rule would allow admission of “any prior
statements made by the victim in a murder case,”137 but “[t]he adoption of a specific intent requirement limited the Rule to witness tampering cases.”138
IV. EFFECT OF GILES: FROM FORFEITURE TO WAIVER
The effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Giles is a move from the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing to a waiver of the confrontation right by misconduct, thereby aligning it with other criminal procedure rights under the Confrontation Clause. This section begins with a discussion of the difference between the
terms “forfeiture” and “waiver,” then provides a brief overview of other rights under the Confrontation Clause and their waiver requirements, and ends with a comparison of a defendant’s rights under the Giles decision with other confrontation
rights.
A. Forfeiture Versus Waiver
The terms “forfeiture” and “waiver” are often substituted for one another, but
there is a key difference. 139 This impacts forfeiture by wrongdoing, because the
doctrine “reaches beyond waiver to forfeiture, where the loss of the right is tied to
activity months or years before a trial is contemplated, when the consequences of
the act cannot be foreseen.”140
________________________

132.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
133.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s note.
134.
See Flanagan, supra note 105, at 478-79. “[F]orfeiture better reflected the rationale of the Rule [and
t]he courts had previously made a similar adjustment . . . .” Id. at 478.
135.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s note (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d
269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)).
136.
Minutes of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, June 19, 1996, available at 1996 WL
936792, *24 (J.C.U.S.).
137.
Id.
138.
See Flanagan, supra note 105, at 477.
139.
Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 443.
140.
See Flanagan, supra note 105, at 527.
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A waiver is defined as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.”141 Thus, the mental state of a defendant is at issue when
determining waiver.142 In criminal procedure, a waiver must usually be done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 143
“In contrast to a waiver, a forfeiture occurs by operation of law, regardless of
the state of mind of the defendant. Forfeiture is a consequence of another action
performed by the defendant which may have unforeseen and unintended consequences for the affected individual.”144
Furthermore, forfeiture by wrongdoing is a broad concept that encompasses
waiver: “Waiver . . . is merely one means by which a forfeiture may occur. Some
rights may be forfeited by means short of waiver . . . .’”145 Thus, it is possible for a
defendant to both forfeit and waive his rights by the same actions. 146
B. Waiver of Confrontation Rights in Other Criminal Contexts
A defendant’s confrontation right flows from the Sixth Amendment, which
states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.”147 At its foundation, it requires the
presence of both the defendant and the witness; if one of those two parties is absent, then the confrontation right is implicated.148 There are three typical situations
in which one of those two parties is absent, thereby implicating the confrontation
right: when a defendant is concealing the location of a witness, voluntarily absenting himself from the trial, or removed from the courtroom due to his misbehavior.149 These three “major confrontation cases all satisfy the knowing waiver of
rights rationale because they all involve direct decisions by the defendant . . . The
immediate and inevitable consequence of the knowing waiver of rights theory [is]
the loss of a Sixth Amendment right.”150
In the first instance, when a defendant conceals the location of the witness, the
touted case is Reynolds.151 If you will recall, Reynolds refused to disclose the whereabouts of his alleged second wife when presented with a subpoena for her appearance as a witness in his trial for bigamy.152 By Reynolds’ direct actions in
________________________

141.
142.

Id. at 473 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
Id. at 474.

143.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
144.
See Flanagan, supra note 105, at 474.
145.
Giles 2, 152 P.3d at 442 (citations omitted) (quoting Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 894-95,
n.2).
146.
See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
147.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
148.
“One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be
present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (citing Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892)).
149.
See Flanagan, supra note 105, at 526-27.
150.
Id.
151.
See supra notes 62-69, 120-23 and accompanying text.
152.
See supra note 64-66 and accompanying text.
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keeping the witness away, he not only forfeited his confrontation rights by wrongdoing, but in turn knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.153
Secondly, a defendant may voluntarily choose to be absent from trial. In Diaz
v. United States,154 the defendant was on trial for homicide. 155 During the trial the
defendant was out on bail and voluntarily absented himself by sending a message
to the court stating that the trial should proceed without him but with his counsel. 156
One of the defendant’s arguments on appeal included that the court improperly
proceeded in the defendant’s absence because he could not waive his right to be
present.157 According to the Court:
[T]he prevailing rule has been, that if, after the trial has begun in
his presence, [a defendant] voluntarily absents himself, this does
not nullify what has been done or prevent the completion of the
trial, but, on the contrary, operates as a waiver of his right to be
present, and leaves the court free to proceed with the trial in like
manner and with like effect as if he were present. 158
The Court also employed a policy argument, in that a defendant should not be
able to “paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries” by not allowing a waiver of
the right to be present when a defendant “escape[s] from prison[] or [absconds]
from the jurisdiction while at large on bail.”159 Thus, a defendant may waive his
confrontation right through a voluntary absence because a reasonable person could
only conclude that such a choice would result in the consequence of not being
present at trial.
Finally, a defendant may be removed from the courtroom due to his own disruptive behavior. In Illinois v. Allen,160 the defendant refused counsel and was allowed to proceed pro se.161 However, he refused to follow the judge’s instructions,
made abusive comments to the judge, and tore and threw papers in the courtroom. 162 The judge warned him that if his behavior continued he would be removed from the courtroom, but the defendant continued to proceed inappropriately.163 The judge removed the defendant from the courtroom and ordered the trial to
continue in his absence. 164 The defendant was allowed to return when he requested
to be present and was given another warning that he needed to act appropriately. 165
________________________

153.
See Flanagan, supra note 105, at 527; see also supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
154.
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
155.
Id. at 444. The crime took place in the Philippines, so their laws were considered, but the Court also
considered and examined U.S. law. See id. at 454-55.
156.
Id.
157.
Id. at 453.
158.
Id. at 455.
159.
Id. at 458.
160.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
161.
Id. at 339.
162.
Id. at 339-40.
163.
Id. at 340.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol13/iss1/4

16

: Goodbye Forfeiture, Hello Waiver

Fall 2009

Goodbye Forfeiture, Hello Waiver

153

However, he interfered with the proceeding and was removed once again. 166 When
the prosecution rested, the defendant was allowed to return to the courtroom when
he promised to behave. 167 The defendant later alleged that his constitutional right
to be present at trial had been violated. 168 The Court held that:
[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has
been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues
his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the
court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. 169
Here, the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right
to be present at trial because he proceeded with his disruptive actions despite his
awareness of the consequences through the judge’s warnings.
Through this synopsis of the three main avenues in which the confrontation
right may be implicated, by the absence of either the witness or the defendant, we
find that criminal procedure aspires for a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the confrontation right. By adding an intent requirement to forfeiture by
wrongdoing, the Giles court continues this aspiration. The Giles decision is an
attempt to align the forfeiture doctrine with the waiver requirements when other
confrontation rights are at issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Brenda is dead.170 She has been silenced and cannot testify at the trial of her
killer. After Giles, there are three options for her voice to be heard at trial: 1) her
statements must be classified as non-testimonial,171 2) Dwayne must have had the
particular intent to prevent her from testifying when he killed her, 172 or 3) Dwayne
must have had intent to isolate Brenda and prevent her from reporting domestic
violence when the prior statements were made. 173
By deciding Giles and requiring the particular intent of a defendant to prevent
the witness from testifying, the Court has aligned the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing with other criminal waivers of confrontation rights. This alignment
provides an extra measure of protection to defendants, but further silences victims.
________________________

166.
Id. at 341.
167.
Allen, 397 U.S. at 341. Appointed counsel conducted his defense. Id.
168.
Id. at 339.
169.
Id. at 343. The Court also found three specific constitutional ways for trial courts to deal with similar
defendants: “(1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the
courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.” Id. at 344. Regarding the first option, duct tape was
recently used to gag a disruptive defendant. Judge Orders Defendant’s Mouth Taped Shut, April 21, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30335202/?GT1=43001.
170.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
171.
See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
172.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
173.
See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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